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Abstract
We propose a mechanism design approach to study the role of a mediator in
dispute resolution and bargaining. The mediator provides a buyer and a seller
with “reality checks” by controlling the information each party has about her
own value for a transaction, and proposes a price at which trade can occur if
parties agree. We first consider the class of static information disclosure and
trading mechanisms, in which the mediator simultaneously selects the informa-
tion disclosed to the parties and posts the price at which they can trade. We
characterize the mechanism that maximizes the ex-ante gains from trade. We
show it is optimal to restrict agents’ information, as this allows to increase the
volume of trade and complete some of the most valuable trades that are lost in
the welfare maximizing mechanism under full information. We then study the
value of the mediator engaging in “shuttle diplomacy” by considering a class
of dynamic information disclosure and trading mechanisms, and show that it is
possible to design a dynamic mechanism that achieves ex-post efficiency. Shuttle
diplomacy facilitates trade by allowing the mediator to condition information re-
leases and prices posted on the history of feedbacks she receives from the parties
during her meetings with them.
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1 Introduction
In April of 2019, U.S. District Court Judge Vince Chhabria appointed Ken Feinberg to
facilitate a settlement between Bayer and over 13,000 plaintiffs who had alleged that
the weed killer Roundup causes non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to its active ingredi-
ent, glyphosate. Feinberg is an expert mediator who had previously mediated many
disputes, including settlement of the 9/11 victims fund and BP Deepwater Horizon
disaster. Unlike, say, in arbitration, mediators are not allowed to impose a judgment
on the parties. The mediator seeks to bring about a mutually-agreed upon resolution.
The dynamic process of mediation has been described as follows:
“Mediations are in the main assisted negotiations. The mediator goes back
and forth with demands and offers (and counter demands and counter of-
fers), while, at the same time, the mediator asks questions and makes com-
ments about the dispute, so that each side can more objectively and real-
istically consider the facts and think about what might happen if the case
were to go to a verdict. Through this process, the “demands” for settle-
ment by the plaintiffs tend to become more realistic, and the offers of the
defendants, similarly, tend to increase.”1
Mediators often provide two services. First, in communicating with parties they
acquire information that is privately known to one party and selectively transmit it
to the other party. Second, the mediator (usually a retired judge or well-experienced
lawyer) brings her own expertise to bear on the question of case value. The mediation
literature often labels these two roles as facilitative versus evaluative mediation styles.
See for example Smartsettle (2017): “The mediator who evaluates assumes that the
participants want and need her to provide some guidance as to the appropriate grounds
for settlement based on law, industry practice or technology – and that she is qualified
to give such guidance by virtue of her training, experience, and objectivity .... the
facilitative mediator assumes that her principal mission is to clarify and to enhance
communication between the parties in order to help them decide what to do.” As
1National Arbitration and Mediation (2019).
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pointed out by Carbone (2019): “The best mediators will use an approach that draws
upon both styles as the needs of the case require.” As an evaluator, the mediator helps
parties to assess the merits of the case and provides them with “reality checks,”often
engaging in “shuttle diplomacy,” meeting with each side in a private caucus. She may
at the same time act as a facilitator, collecting information from a party and then
leaking some of it to the other side.
In lawsuit mediation the mediator’s expertise and role as an evaluator is especially
important if the case involves issues of first impression, like the Roundup litigation;
that is, new legal issues or interpretations brought before a court that have not been
addressed before by that court or that court’s jurisdiction. There, as part of the settle-
ment, the plaintiffs want Bayer to label Roundup as including a cancer causing ingredi-
ent. Yet the EPA has repeatedly found glyphosate to be safe; the conflict between the
proposed settlement and the regulator’s explicit opposition sits in unchartered legal
territory. In issues of first impression, the mediator often has access to information
that parties don’t have. How so? The mediator has been involved in other mediations,
many of which are not in the public domain. She can thus help to determine costs
and benefits for the plaintiff’s claim – costs and benefits that the parties themselves
can’t identify without his help. In the Roundup litigation, for example, these costs and
benefit relate to the likely outcomes of the litigation process.
In this paper we examine the mediator’s role in providing expert advice and helping
parties to reach a settlement. The parties have some beliefs about the value of the case,
but they do not know that value for sure. The mediator, then, sets up an information
disclosure policy: what to say about the case, to whom in a private session and at
what point in the negotiations? This policy tracks the Bayesian persuasion models:
it allows revelation of information that is Bayes consistent with the prior. As in the
mechanism design literature, the mediator also proposes the terms of a deal. In short,
our mediator is both a mechanism designer and an information designer.
Lawsuit mediation is one application of the model, but there are many others.
Consider for example the informal role of the US in the Camp David resolution of the
Egypt/Israel conflict. What should President Carter have revealed to each side and
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at what point in the negotiation process? President Carter had access to information
unknown to both parties (about the US’s position, and the views of the broader inter-
national community). Informal mediation has a long tradition across different cultures;
in China it goes back to Confucianism and recently “top political-legal authorities of
the Chinese Communist Party have been promoting mediation as the key to resolving
all disputes” (Pissler, 2013). Disputes which formal or informal mediation is commonly
used to resolve include: conflict between members of a family or business relationship,
conflict in the workplace, conflict arising out of a commercial transaction including
cross border trade, real estate matters and personal property.
To facilitate comparison with the literature on bargaining/mechanism design (e.g.,
Myerson and Satthertwaite, 1983; Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983), we cast our anal-
ysis in terms of a commercial transaction in which the holder of an asset or a claim, the
seller, faces a potential buyer. Neither the buyer nor the seller have precise information
about their valuation for the asset. The mediator then provides some appropriately
selected information to each party, on which basis they both refine their beliefs about
their valuations. We can say she provides them with reality checks and then proposes a
transaction price. The mediator may also engage in shuttle diplomacy by meeting the
parties in several rounds, in each round both releasing some information and obtaining
some feedback from them.
One can interpret the mechanism designer in Myerson and Satthertwaite (1983), or
coordinator as they refer to her, as a mediator. However there, as well as in the models
in law and economics that study the role of mediation (e.g., Brown and Ayres, 1994,
Doornik, 2014, and Goltsman et al., 2009), parties are assumed to have full information
about their values at the outset. The coordinator then only plays a facilitative role,
collecting information from both parties and distributing it strategically via a proposed
trading deal, which might convey to a party that she had a relatively optimistic view
of her bargaining position.
Mediators do play this facilitative role in practice and we maintain it in our model,
but we go a step further and allow the mediator also to provide parties directly with
reality checks by transmitting information that they don’t have. In our model the
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mediator is not just a facilitator, but is also an expert evaluator who runs experiments
providing parties with information. We maintain, however, the assumption that the
true values of the parties are a private matter. The mediator privately and indepen-
dently informs each party about different features of the asset and each party updates
her valuation depending on how much she values the different features and this is the
party’s private information. An alternative interpretation of this role of the mediator
is also possible: each party can directly acquire information about her value, but the
mediator monitors and enforces the parties’ commitment to discover the prescribed –
limited – amount of information.
As in the Bayesian persuasion literature, we give extended leeway to the mediator
about how much the parties discover about their values. Our first main result concerns
the amount of information that a mediator, aiming to maximize the ex-ante gains
from trade, should provide to parties: some amount of obfuscation is optimal. This is
established by considering first static procedures, or mechanisms, in which the mediator
simultaneously selects the information received by the parties and the price at which
they may trade. We show that the optimal static mechanism restricts the agent’s
information to be monotone binary partitions (i.e., let the parties discover whether their
value is above or below a threshold). Providing traders with less than full information
increases the volume of trade. This has two effects on welfare. First, some ex-post
efficient trades take place that would not be completed under full information. Second,
some ex-post inefficient trades are also completed that would not occur under full
information. If information is properly selected as described above, the first effect
dominates. Hence the ex-ante gains from trade, or welfare, are higher than in any
static mechanism when buyer and seller are provided with full information. We show
that they can also be higher than in the welfare maximizing Bayesian mechanism under
full information;2 a fitting testament to the power of controlling the information flow.
Our second novel result both relative to the persuasion and the mechanism design
literature is that restricting attention to static procedures is with loss of generality.
2 In that case (considered by Myerson and Satterthwaite and the mechanism design literature
which followed), as mentioned above, the mediator can ask parties to simultaneously report their
value and determine the terms of trade accordingly.
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In particular, when the information available to parties over their valuations is exoge-
nously given, by the revelation principle static, direct mechanisms can describe any
outcome; there is no scope for using dynamic mechanisms. This is not the case in
our model. We show that ex-post efficiency (and hence maximal ex-ante gains from
trade) can always be achieved with a dynamic procedure, characterized by a sequence
of information discoveries by parties and of trading prices. There is so a clear rationale
for shuttle diplomacy. In contrast, this is not possible with the optimal static proce-
dure we derive (nor with the optimal Bayesian mechanism with full information). Our
findings so provide a clear rationale for shuttle diplomacy.
To understand the value of the mediator engaging in shuttle diplomacy, we should
point out that a dynamic procedure allows to condition the information that is released
to each party, as well as the price posted at any point in time, on the history of feedbacks
received from parties about the information they learnt. As a consequence, we show it
is possible to provide parties with the minimum amount of information that is needed to
determine whether or not trade is ex-post efficient. Limiting the information available
to parties, as argued above, improves agents’ incentives and facilitates trade. Incentives
are now also improved by the feature that agents’ reports affect not only the terms
of trade proposed by the mediator but also the subsequent information releases to all
parties.
More precisely, we consider a class of dynamic procedures where the mediator pro-
gressively reveal to the seller (resp. the buyer) whether her value is equal or below
(resp. above) a moving threshold. At any point in time along the sequence each party
is given the chance to report to have become fully informed. When that happens, the
other party is only additionally informed of whether her value is above or below the
value reported by the first party. The price proposed by the mediator is such that both
parties gain from trade if it is efficient to trade at the reported value. This sequence
of information releases based on parties’ reports allows to correlate the information
that is made available to the parties. We show that we can always find a path for the
speed for the learning process of the two parties and for the prices set by the mediator
such that it is incentive compatible for each party to report a discovery of her value
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if and only if that happens. Given this, whenever a price is selected by the mediator,
each party knows whether her value is above or below it and hence they agree to trade
whenever trade is ex-post efficient. This ensures that it is always possible to design an
ex-post efficient shuttle diplomacy mechanisms.
Related literature. First, from a substantive point of view the paper contributes
to the law and economics literature on mediation. It shows that some of the charac-
teristics of a common institutional practice – mediation – minimize the efficiency loss
associated with dispute resolution. As we already pointed out, law and economics
papers on mediation rely on asymmetric information, but assume that parties have
full information about their values. For example, Brown and Ayres (1994) argue that
mediators reduce adverse selection by committing parties to simple mechanisms; e.g.,
“(1) by committing parties to break off negotiations when private representations to
a mediator indicate that there are no gains from trade; (2) by committing parties to
equally divide the gains from trade; and (3) by committing to send noisy translations of
information disclosed during private caucuses.” Doornik (2014) argues that the role of
a mediator is to avoid a costly trial by verifying the private information of the informed
party and communicating it to the other party, without disclosing confidential details
that would disadvantage the informed party. Goltsman et al. (2009) studied mediation
in a cheap talk framework and showed that by adding noise a mediator may relax the
incentive compatibility constraint of the informed party and thus facilitate information
transmission. While insightful, these models cannot explain either the evaluative role
of the mediator, or the benefits of the mediator engaging in shuttle diplomacy.
Second, from a substantive and methodological point of view, the paper contributes
to the literature on mechanism design and the literature on Bayesian persuasion in-
troduced by Kamenica and Gentzkov (2011) (see also Rayo and Segal, 2010, Kolotilin
et al., 2017 and Li and Norman, 2018) and recently reviewed by Bergemann and Mor-
ris (2019). As the information designer in the persuasion literature, our mediator is
able to commit to an information structure that maps states of the world (a party’s
value) into stochastic signals privately disclosed (to each party) and not observed by
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the mediator. In addition, and also in common with the information designer of the
persuasion literature, our mediator knows the prior value distributions and may use
all feasible information disclosure policies. But in contrast to the information designer
of the persuasion literature, who cannot affect the outcomes available to the players,
and like the designer in the classic mechanism design literature (e.g., see Myerson and
Satterthwaite, 1983), our mediator may also affect outcomes, by setting the price at
which parties may trade. Thus, our mediator plays both the role of an information de-
signer in the persuasion literature, and the classical designer in the mechanism design
literature (see Mezzetti, 2019, for a brief discussion on this dual role of a designer).
This feature is shared by our paper with the literature on information disclosure
and surplus extraction by the seller of a single item, where the seller chooses both an
information and a sale policy (Bergemann and Pesendorfer, 2007, Eso¨ and Szentes,
2007, Li and Shi, 2017 and Kra¨mer, 2018).3 There are several differences, however,
apart from the objective of our mediator being to maximize welfare. First, in our paper
there is private information on both sides of the market and an information structure
must be chosen for both. In contrast, in the papers cited above there is no uncertainty
regarding the seller’s value but there could be several buyers and the focus is then on
the information of each of them. Second, in the static disclosure setting we focus on
simple price posting mechanisms, rather than “rich contracting protocols” (Kra¨hmer,
2018).4 Third, and most important, as opposed to the single-round disclosure poli-
cies of most of the surplus extraction literature, our main contribution is to study a
dynamic shuttle diplomacy procedure and show that the sequence of disclosures and
trade opportunities allow to significantly increases the set of outcomes the mediator
3 The combination of information and mechanism design is also present in Roesler and Szentes
(2017) and Condorelli and Szentes (2019), but in those papers it is the buyer that selects her own
information structure so as to protect herself from the seller’s choice of a sales mechanism aiming to
maximize her surplus.
4 Given the timing assumption, in our static procedure the trading mechanism can only be a posted
price. In this regard, it is useful to point out that when agents are fully informed about their values,
the only dominant strategy mechanisms that balance the budget at all signal realizations (i.e., such
that the law of one price holds) and satisfy agents’ participation constraints ex-post are price posting
mechanisms in which the mediator posts a single price at which trade may take place (see Hagerty and
Rogerson, 1987, Cˇopicˇ and Ponsati, 2016, and Cˇopicˇ, 2017; for the robustness of dominant strategy
mechanisms, see Bergemann and Morris, 2005).
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may achieve; in particular, it allows implementation of the first best outcome.
We are only aware of two exceptions to single-round disclosures in the surplus
extraction literature. The first is Bergemann and Wambach (2015); they introduce an
auction with sequential disclosure of information in which each bidder, like the buyer
in our shuttle diplomacy mechanism, learns a progressively higher lower bound on her
value for the item for sale. They show that such auction implements the outcome
of the handicap auction in Eso¨ and Szentes (2007) while strengthening the bidders’
participation constraints from interim to ex post. The second is Heumann (2019), in
which the buyer observes the realization of a signal process in continuous time and
makes then a report to the seller at each point in time. The paper characterizes the
profit-maximizing mechanism when the seller can choose the information content of
the signal process, the quantity to be sold, and the price to be charged, as functions of
the entire history of reports by the buyer.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setting. Section 3 studies
the role of the mediator in providing reality checks by examining static procedures and
characterizing the optimal one. Section 4 considers sequential disclosures and the role
of shuttle diplomacy, establishing the result that all gains from trade can be realized.
Section 5 contains some extensions and Section 6 concludes. All the proofs that are
omitted in the main text can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Setting
We analyze a stylized model, so as to extract the main insights about the role a
mediator plays in dispute resolution and, more generally, in bargaining. We consider
a commercial transaction in which the holder of an asset, the seller, faces a potential
buyer, but the model could be applied more generally. The two parties use a mediator
to help them to discover their benefits of making the transaction and to set the price
at which it may take place.
The environment is a standard one, with one indivisible object and a seller and
a buyer with independent private values. Let vB ∈ [0, 1] be the buyer’s value from
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acquiring the asset and vS ∈ [0, 1] be the seller’s cost, or value lost, from giving
away the asset she holds. Let F0(v) = Pr(value ≤ v) and G0(v) = Pr(cost ≤ v)
be the distributions from which value and cost are independently drawn. We assume
that F0 and G0 have no atoms and admit strictly positive everywhere densities f0
and g0; the expectations according to these distributions are v
B
0 =
∫ 1
0
vdF0(v) and
vS0 =
∫ 1
0
vdG0(v). Prior to the experiments designed by the mediator, neither the
buyer nor the seller or the mediator have any information regarding the draws from F0
and G0.
The mediator chooses both the trading procedure and the information disclosure
policy. We consider here the case where the mediator is benevolent and his goal is
to maximize the gains from trade. The mediator’s disclosure policy is subject to a
‘privacy constraint’: it is given by two sets of experiments, one that provides the
buyer some information (only) about her value and the other providing the seller some
information (only) about her cost. Otherwise, we allow the mediator to use the most
general signaling technology; that is, as in the literature on Bayesian persuasion (e.g.,
see Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, and Bergemann and Morris, 2019) the mediator is
free to choose any disclosure policy that is consistent with the prior distribution. Thus,
our results should be viewed as providing an upper bound on the worth of a mediator
in dispute resolution.5
We can think of the disclosure policy and the privacy constraint as describing a
situation where the mediator privately and independently informs each of the two par-
ties about some characteristics of the object. The way in which each party updates
her valuation depends on how much she values the different characteristics and this
is the party’s private information. As we pointed out in the introduction, an alterna-
tive interpretation is that the information is directly acquired by the parties and the
mediator monitors and enforces their commitment to obtain the prescribed, typically
incomplete, amount of information.
5 In future research, it would be valuable to explore additional practical constraints on the signaling
technology available to a mediator.
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3 Reality Checks: Static Mechanisms
In this section we focus on the role of the mediator as providing reality checks to the
parties. To this end we examine the case in which the information disclosure and the
trading mechanism are static: the mediator simultaneously chooses the distribution of
the signals received, respectively, by the buyer and the seller, as well as a price p. The
buyer and the seller, after observing the realization of their own signal, decide then
whether or not they wish to trade at the price p.
The analysis of this case provides a useful benchmark and starting point, that al-
lows to clearly illustrate how limiting the information available to parties may serve
to mitigate incentives and facilitate trade. Given this, the consideration of a simple
trading mechanism, where a single price is selected at the same time the signal dis-
tributions of the two parties are chosen, makes the analysis more transparent. As we
will see, what proves to be a real limitation for the attainable outcomes is the fact
that the information is provided to parties only once and simultaneously. In the next
section, we will extend the analysis to the case where the mediator also engages in
shuttle diplomacy, allowing for a sequence of information disclosures to the parties,
and of associated prices posted, based on the reports sent by parties regarding the in-
formation received at previous rounds. We will show that in that case all ex-post gains
from trade can be realized. In contrast, this is not possible with static information
disclosures even if, as we argue later, we allow for Bayesian mechanisms, where the
terms of trade are set after the parties receive information, on the basis of the reports
sent by them.
Without loss of generality, the signal that an agent receives can be interpreted
as an unbiased estimate of her private value or cost. As the mediator decides the
signal structure but does not observe the realization of the signal, to keep track of
the information disclosed from the point of view of the mediator, the signal itself is
irrelevant; it is sufficient to consider the induced posterior distribution of the expected
value and cost. Consider the buyer. The situation in which the buyer has not been
disclosed any information corresponds to the case in which the posterior distribution
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of the value has an atom of mass one on vB0 , while the situation in which the buyer has
been fully disclosed her value corresponds to the case in which, from the point of view of
the mediator (and the seller), the posterior distribution is F0, the true distribution from
which the value is drawn. Intermediate disclosure policies must lead to distributions
F that are mean preserving spreads of the distribution with unit mass on vB0 and such
that F0 is a mean preserving spread of F .
Similarly, the situation in which the seller has not been disclosed any information
corresponds to the case in which the posterior distribution of the cost has an atom
of mass one on vS0 and the situation in which the seller has been fully disclosed her
cost corresponds to the case in which the posterior distribution is the true distribution
G0. Intermediate disclosure policies lead to distributions G that are mean preserving
spreads of the distribution with unit mass on vS0 and such that G0 is a mean preserving
spread of G.
Thus, the families of signal distributions over the buyer’s value and the seller’s cost
that can be feasibly induced by the mediator are:6
F =
{
F :
∫ 1
0
vdF (v) = vB0 and
∫ z
0
F (v)dv ≤
∫ z
0
F0(v)dv for all z ∈ [0, 1]
}
G =
{
G :
∫ 1
0
vdG(v) = vS0 and
∫ z
0
G(v)dv ≤
∫ z
0
G0(v)dv for all z ∈ [0, 1]
}
If the distribution F has an atom at vB, we will denote the probability mass on vB
as 1F (v
B); similarly, we will denote the probability mass on vS according to the distri-
bution G as 1G(v
S). Because of the possibility of atoms, when it comes to the buyer it
is sometimes convenient to work with the reliability function RF (v) = Pr(value ≥ v)
instead of the distribution of signals F (v); note that if RF is the reliability associated
with the distribution F , then RF (v) = 1− F (v) + 1F (v).
We can now state more formally the mediator’s problem in the present environment.
The mediator chooses signal distributions F ∈ F for the buyer and G ∈ G for the seller
together with a price p; that is, she chooses a static disclosure and trading mechanism,
6 As the signal distributions could be continuous or discrete, all the integrals in the paper should
be understood as Stieltjes integrals.
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a triple 〈F,G, p〉, with F ∈ F , G ∈ G and p ∈ R+. After the buyer receives a signal
from F and the seller from G, each of them decides whether or not to trade at the
price p. It is immediate to verify that it is a dominant strategy for the buyer to accept
to trade if and only if the signal received is vB ≥ p and for the seller to do so if and
only if the signal received is vS ≤ p.7 Since the mediator’s goal is to maximize the
gains from trade, the optimal static disclosure and trading mechanism is obtained as
a solution of the following problem:
max
p∈[0,1], F∈F , G∈G
∫ 1
p
∫ p
0
(vB − vS)dG(vS)dF (vB)
or, equivalently:
max
p∈[0,1], F∈F , G∈G
G(p)
∫ 1
p
vBdF (vB)−RF (p)
∫ p
0
vSdG(vS)
Letting EF and EG be the conditional expectation operators associated respectively
with the distributions F and G, the mediator’s problem can also be rewritten as follows:
max
p∈[0,1], F∈F , G∈G
(
EF
[
vB|vB ≥ p]− EG[vS|vS ≤ p])RF (p)G(p) (1)
We begin by establishing an important preliminary result: it is sufficient for the
mediator to select a disclosure policy that only has two realizations, a high and a low
signal. This follows from the fact that each party faces a binary decision, to accept or
reject trade at the price posted by the mediator.
Lemma 1 Given any solution to the mediator’s maximization problem (1), there is a
payoff equivalent solution in which the mediator chooses a two-point signal distribution
both for the buyer and the seller.
Building on Lemma 1, we show next that the solution of the mediator problem pre-
scribes that a threshold for the buyer’s value and one for the seller’s cost are chosen;
7 Using a more traditional mechanism design language, it is a dominant strategy for both agents
to report truthfully the signal received, which determines whether or not trade occurs at the given
posted price.
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traders are then informed whether their value and cost are above or below their thresh-
old. That is, the information conveyed to the parties at the optimal static mechanism,
solving (1), has a very simple, binary, monotone, partition structure. A mediator aim-
ing to maximize the gains from trade will choose signal distributions and a price such
that the buyer types above the buyer’s threshold and the seller types below the seller’s
threshold will want to trade, while the other types will refuse to trade. The optimal
binary partitions that constitute the signals for seller and buyer are then characterized
in the following:
Proposition 1 In the static information disclosure and trading mechanism that max-
imizes the gains from trade, the buyer observes whether her value is strictly below some
threshold x and the seller observes whether her cost is strictly above some other thresh-
old y, with x, y satisfying:
EG0 [vS | vS ≤ y] = x and
EF0 [vB | vB ≥ x] = y. (2)
The trading price is any p ∈ [EG0 [vS | vS ≤ y],EF0 [vB | vB ≥ x]] = [x, y].
It is immediate to verify that system (2) always admits a solution for x, y and that
x < y.8 At the optimal mechanism, trade occurs when the buyer’s valuation happens
to be above x and the seller’s valuation below y. Since x < y, trade may occur when the
buyer’s value is below the seller’s value. This is an important difference relative to the
case of a mediator providing full information to the parties. Under full information,
only buyers with a value above the posted price p and sellers with a value below p
trade. The reason why a full information disclosure policy is not optimal is that it
does not generate enough trade: any efficient trade with either (i) p > vB > vS,
8 Since G0, F0 have no atoms, EG0 [vS | vS ≤ y] < y for all y > 0 and is continuous and strictly
increasing in y, while EF0 [vB | vB ≥ x] > x for all x < 1 and is continuous and strictly increasing in
x. Hence if a solution exists, we have x < y. To show existence define the following function of x
with domain and range [0, 1]: EG0
[
vS | vS ≤ EF0 [vB | vB ≥ x]
]
. Since it is the composite function of
two continuous functions, it is continuous. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem it has a fixed point x∗
and thus x∗ and y∗ = EF0
[
vB | vB ≥ x∗] is a solution of (2). Note that multiple solutions may exist,
in which case one of them is the optimum.
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or (ii) vB > vS > p is lost. The optimal static information disclosure and trading
mechanism, given the property x < y, guarantees completion of a higher volume of
trades. Some of the most valuable trades which are lost under full information – those
with (i) vB = p − εv and vS = εc and those with (ii) vB = 1 − εv and vS = p + εc
(for εv, εc small) – take place under the optimal mechanism.
9 Inducing completion of
valuable trades in the optimal mechanism comes at a cost: some inefficient trades are
also completed (this never happens when parties are fully informed), but those are
the ones that have smaller losses; trades with vS = y − εc > vB = x + εv. Moreover,
there are also some less valuable, but still efficient, trades that are not completed in
the optimal mechanism (e.g., those for which x > vB > vS or vB > vS > y).
Note that the freedom the mediator has in the choice of the price allows her to
pursue the additional goal of an equitable division of the gains from trade. For example,
a 50-50 split of the ex-post surplus between buyer and seller could be simply obtained
by setting p = x+y
2
.
The above result and discussion show the benefits of limiting the information avail-
able to parties in order to increase their willingness to trade. At the same time, with
a binary partition structure the information provided to parties is too coarse to ensure
that all gains from trade are realized; that is, to ensure that trade occurs only and in
all the situations where it is ex-post efficient. To further and more clearly illustrate
these properties we present next the optimal disclosure and trading mechanism in the
canonical example where both the distributions of the value F0 and the cost G0 are
uniform.
Uniform Prior Distributions When F0 (v) = G0 (v) = v, the solution of the
optimal disclosure policy we obtain from (2) is x = 1/3 and y = 2/3. Thus, the buyer
observes whether her value is above or below 1/3, while the seller observes whether
her cost is above or below 2/3. Any price p ∈ [1/3, 2/3] is then an optimal trading
price. The expected gains from trade that are realized in the optimal disclosure and
trading mechanism are
(
2
3
− 1
3
)
2
3
2
3
= 4
27
or 89% of the first best level (that is, when
9 This can be seen most clearly when x < p < y.
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trade occurs whenever it is ex-post efficient), which is 1
6
.
When F0 and G0 are uniform, the optimal price posting as well as the optimal
Bayesian mechanism if agents have full information about their own values are well
known (see Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983, and Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).
In that case the optimal posted price is p = 1
2
, which yields expected gains from trade
of
(
3
4
− 1
4
)
1
2
1
2
= 1
8
, or 75% of the first best level. Hence the mediator’s ability to control
the information available to the agents about their private values leads to a significant
increase in the realized gains from trade, by generating a greater volume of trade.
Trade occurs in fact whenever the buyer has a value greater than 1/3 and the seller
smaller than 2/3 (instead of when the two are, respectively, higher and smaller than
1/2).
Interestingly, the realized gains from trade at the optimal static disclosure and
trading mechanism are also higher than at the optimal Bayesian mechanism when
traders are fully informed. In the latter mechanism trade takes place whenever vB ≥
vS + 1/4 and expected gains from trade are 9
64
or 84% of the first best level.
At the same time, at our optimal static mechanism there is still a welfare loss, 11%
of total surplus, due to the fact that parties do not have enough information to prevent
inefficient trades from being completed (when 1/3 < vB < vS < 2/3) or to realize all
ex-post efficient trades (when vB > vS and vB < 1/3 or vS < 2/3).
Remark 1: Bayesian Trading Mechanisms. In the set-up described above, the
fact that the terms of trade are set contemporaneously to the signal distribution implies
that at the selected trading mechanism trade always occurs whenever its (expected)
benefit exceeds the cost; incentive constraints do not bind. This is true both at the
optimal information structure and with full information.
If we retain the static feature of the information disclosure to the parties, but allow
for Bayesian trading mechanisms, where the terms of trade may depend on agents’
reporting on the information they have discovered, we can allow for richer patterns of
trade but incentives clearly constrain the trading mechanism, which then depends on
the information disclosed to the parties. As is well known (Myerson and Satterthwaite,
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1983), even if we allow for Bayesian trading mechanisms a welfare loss, relative to
the first best, remains when parties are fully informed. Furthermore, as shown above,
with uniform distributions the welfare loss is even higher than at the optimal static
disclosure and trade mechanism.
One may wonder whether the efficiency loss can be totally eliminated by suitably
designing the information made available to the parties, while retaining the static prop-
erty of the information disclosure process, if we allow for Bayesian trading mechanisms.
The answer is no, ex-post efficiency of trades cannot be obtained. The reason is that,
to ensure that trade occurs if and only if it is efficient, the two parties must have the
information required to do that. When the distributions of the signals received by the
two parties are chosen simultaneously, this requirement essentially corresponds to both
parties being fully informed (in which case, as argued above, ex-post efficiency is not
attainable).10
Remark 2: Partial Correlation of Values. We have assumed that the buyer and
seller’s values are independently drawn, but in several applications it would seem rea-
sonable to allow some components of the valuations to be correlated random variables.
For example, when applying the model to litigation, it is natural to think that part
of the plaintiff’s cost of selling a legal claim (i.e., settling) and part of the defendant’s
value of buying the legal claim are correlated, as both the defendant’s value and the
plaintiff’s cost depend on the settlement decision that the court will impose if media-
tion fails. The court’s decision in turn depends on characteristics of the case which are
relevant for both parties and over which an expert mediator may shed light.
The simplest way to see the impact of partial correlation in values is to postulate
that there exists an additional random variable θ that affects the value of both parties;
that is, to assume that the buyer and seller’s value depend in a separable way on
their independent private components vB, vS and a common component θ. Under this
condition, the analysis of the optimal static disclosure and trading mechanism is similar
10 Characterizing the optimal static information disclosure and Bayesian trading mechanism is a
difficult task. However, also in the light of the result stated in the text we believe that few additional
substantive insights can be gained by such a characterization.
16
to the case of independent private values considered in this section.11,12
Remark 3: Mediator’s Profit. Our mediator’s goal is to maximize welfare, but in
practice some mediators may have a profit motive. If the parties going to a mediator pay
a flat fee, our analysis goes through unchanged. Appealing to reputation considerations
justifies assuming that the mediator will do what is best for the parties, given that her
compensation is not affected.
If, on the other hand, the mediator has the power to select a profit maximizing
scheme, then things are different in general, but the static analysis of this section
goes through with the only modification that the mediator charges and collect a price
pS = EF0 [vB | vB ≥ x] = y from the seller and pays a price pB = EG0 [vS | vS ≤ y] = x
to the buyer. Hence in the case of static disclosure and trade mechanisms, under the
mechanism that maximizes the mediator’s profits trade takes place under the same
circumstances as under the welfare maximizing mechanism and the mediator extract
all gains from trade as net payment from parties.
4 Shuttle Diplomacy: Dynamic Mechanisms
In this section we extend the analysis to shuttle diplomacy, where the mediator ap-
proaches parties sequentially and repeatedly, both to provide them with the outcome of
some suitably designed experiment and to ask them to report, after observing the ex-
periment’s outcome, whether or not they are willing to trade at a price that is proposed
to them. On the basis of the answer received, the information that is subsequently pro-
vided to the other party, and the terms of trade proposed to her, are determined. The
process is then iterated over time. In this case both the information disclosure and the
trading mechanism are dynamic and depend on the agents’ feedback to the mediator.
11 With an independent component in the parties’s value, it is easy to verify that the full rank
condition required for full surplus extraction by Cre´mer and McLean (1988) does not hold. We should
also point out that in mediation practice we do not observe betting mechanisms in the style of Cre´mer
and McLean (1988).
12 An additional insight is that if the mediator discloses the same amount of information about the
common component θ to the two parties, then the mediator prefers full disclosure of the value of θ or
no disclosure, depending on whether the gains from trade are a convex or a concave function of θ.
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We show that the dynamic feature of the mechanism, and in particular the fact that
agents’ reports affect the pattern of future information disclosures in addition to the
terms of trade, allow to enhance efficiency. Indeed, shuttle diplomacy makes it possible
for the mediator to implement a first best, ex-post efficient, outcome.
More precisely, we establish this feature for a shuttle diplomacy procedure in which
the mediator lets the agents discover information over time, alternating between rounds
of discoveries for the buyer and for the seller with associated posted prices. The seller
starts by finding out whether her value is the highest possible and, as new discovery
rounds come along, discovers progressively whether her value is lower and lower. At
the end of each of her discovery rounds, the seller decides whether or not to stop the
discovery phase of the procedure; this can be interpreted as reporting whether or not
she has discovered her true value. If the seller decides to stop, the price is set above
her presumed value and the buyer makes one last discovery. As in a descending clock
auction, in each new discovery round the price that is set if the seller decides to stop
the discovery phase is lower than in the previous one. If the seller decides not to stop,
it is the buyer’s turn to make a discovery, starting from finding out if her value is the
lowest possible. As discovery rounds go by, the buyer discovers whether her value is
higher and higher. Like the seller, after each discovery round she is given the option
to stop the discovery phase, in which case the price is set below her presumed value
and the seller makes one last discovery. As in an ascending clock auction, successive
discovery rounds are associated with progressively higher prices at which the buyer
may stop the discovery phase.
We cast the analysis in a discrete time setting, assuming that the seller is the first to
receive some information. This is without loss of generality, as we will be interested in
the limit, continuous-time, case in which discovery intervals, that is the length of time
between two consecutive discoveries for the buyer, or the seller, become infinitesimally
small. We allow buyer and seller to complete their discovery phase, that is, the set of
discoveries that are made if no party ever decides to stop, at different times. Thus,
we set T S and TB to be the calendar time in which the seller, respectively the buyer,
make her final discovery prescribed by the mechanism. We let ∆ be the length of each
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discovery interval and so the number of such intervals for seller and buyer is equal to
TS
∆
and T
B
∆
, respectively. The maximal duration of the shuttle diplomacy procedure is
then T ≡ max{T S, TB} and can be set without loss of generality to be equal to 1.
The following algorithm formally describes the shuttle diplomacy procedure. It
is constructed so that, if the parties choose to stop the discovery stage when and
only when they discover their values, then the outcome of the limit, continuous-time,
algorithm is ex-post efficient, that is trade occurs whenever vB > vS.
The Shuttle Diplomacy Mechanism
Step 0 . The mediator selects:
• A final buyer and seller value v∗ and posted price pF , with:
EG0
[
vS|vS ≤ v∗] ≤ pF ≤ EF0 [vB|vB ≥ v∗] . (3)
• Two collections of value discovery intervals: {ISt = [αSt , αSt−∆]}TSt=∆ for the seller,
with αS0 = 1, α
S
TS = v
∗, t = ∆, 2∆, ..., T S;
{
IBt =
[
αBt−∆, α
B
t
]}TB
t=∆
for the buyer,
with αB0 = 0, α
B
TB = v
∗, t = ∆, 2∆, ..., TB.
• Two continuously differentiable price functions pS : [v∗, 1] → R+, and pB :
[0, v∗]→ R+
Step 1 . In discovery period t ≤ T S of the Shuttle Stage, the seller:
• Discovers if her value is in ISt , i.e., whether it is vSt = EG0
[
vS|vS ∈ ISt
]
or not;
• Selects whether to Stop or Continue;
– If the choice is Stop, then go to Final Stage;
– If the choice is Continue, then go to:
∗ Step 2 if t ≤ TB;
∗ Step 1 of period t+ ∆ if TB < t < T S;
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∗ The Final Stage if TB < t = T S.
In discovery period t > T S, go to Step 2.
Step 2 . In discovery period t ≤ TB of the Shuttle Stage, the buyer:
• Discovers if her value is in IBt , i.e., whether it is vBt = EF0
[
vB|vB ∈ IBt
]
or not;
• Selects whether to Stop or Continue;
– If the choice is Stop, then go to Final Stage;
– If the choice is Continue, then go to:
∗ Step 1 of period t+ ∆ if t < T = max{T S, TB};
∗ The Final Stage if t = T .
Step 3 . The Final Stage:
1. If t ≤ T S and the seller has decided to Stop at t, then:
• The buyer observes whether her value is above or below vSt ;
• Price pS(vSt ) is posted;
• Buyer and seller decide whether they want to trade at pS(vSt ).
2. If t ≤ TB and the buyer has decided to Stop at t, then:
• The seller observes whether her value is above or below vBt ;
• Price pB(vBt ) is posted;
• Buyer and seller decide whether they want to trade at pB(vBt ).
3. If at t = T = max{T S, TB} neither the buyer nor the seller have decided to Stop,
price pF is posted and buyer and seller decide whether they want to trade at pF .
20
Given the specification of the shuttle diplomacy mechanism, for all t < max{T S, TB}
we have vBt < v
S
t . We will now show that, more generally, it must be that for all
t = ∆, 2∆, ...,max{TB, T S}:
EG0
[
vS|vS ≤ vBt
] ≤ pB (vBt ) ≤ vBt ≤ vSt ≤ pS (vSt ) ≤ EF0 [vB|vB ≥ vSt ] (4)
The mechanism starts in the shuttle stage at t = ∆. In each period t of this stage
in which the seller makes a discovery, the seller learns whether her value lies in the
interval ISt (and thus equals v
S
t ) and then tells the mediator whether she wants to stop
the shuttle stage. If she decides to stop, the mechanism moves to the final stage; the
mediator lets the buyer observe whether her value is above or below vSt and posts a
price pS
(
vSt
)
. Buyer and seller then decide whether or not they want to trade. The
price pS
(
vSt
)
is selected so that, at such a price a seller with value vSt and a buyer
who has observed that her value is above vSt are willing to trade; that is, the last two
inequalities in (4) must hold:
vSt ≤ pS
(
vSt
) ≤ EF0 [vB|vB ≥ vSt ] for all t = ∆, 2∆, ..., T S
If, on the contrary, the seller decides to continue and t < TB, then it’s the buyer’s
turn to discover whether her value is in the interval IBt with expected value v
B
t .
13 The
buyer then decides whether to stop the shuttle stage and if she does the mechanism
moves to the final stage; the mediator lets the seller observe whether her value is above
or below vBt and posts a price p
B
(
vBt
)
at which a buyer with value vBt and a seller
who has observed that her value is below vBt are willing to trade; that is, the first two
inequalities in (4) must hold:
EG0
[
vS|vS ≤ vBt
] ≤ pB (vBt ) ≤ vBt for all t = ∆, ..., TB
If the buyer decides to continue and we are in period t of the shuttle stage, then
13 If instead t > TB the mechanism moves directly to period t+ ∆ (as long as this does not exceed
TS).
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there are two cases. First, if t < T , then the mechanism moves to period t + ∆ of
the shuttle stage and the same steps are repeated. Second, if t = T , so that traders
concluded the shuttle phase always electing to continue, then the mechanism moves to
the final stage and buyer and seller have the option to trade at the posted price pF .
By (3), the level of pF is set in such a way that at this price traders that have not
discovered their true values (i.e., a seller knowing that her value is below and a buyer
knowing that her value is above v∗) will want to trade.
The mechanism allows the two parties to make discoveries at different speed. It
permits one agent to complete the discovery of her value up to the threshold v∗ before
the other agent. For example, if TB < T S the buyer discovers that her value is above
v∗ before the seller discovers that her value is below v∗. The lengths of the intervals
ISt and I
B
t , and the related length ∆ of each discovery interval describe the speed at
which, at any point in time along the discovery process, the seller learns her value
between 1 and v∗ and the buyer learns her value between 0 and v∗.14
Given a shuttle diplomacy mechanism, the strategies of buyer and seller must specify
whether they select Stop or Continue after each discovery and whether they accept to
trade at the price posted by the mediator. We will say that a trader adopts a stopping-
at-value strategy if she always selects Stop after having discovered her value, always
selects Continue after not having discovered her value and always accepts to trade at
a price that yields her a non-negative payoff. As argued above, this can be interpreted
as truthful reporting by each party of the information acquired at each stage.
If both players adopting stopping-at-value strategies constitutes a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the shuttle-diplomacy mechanism, we call such an equilibrium a stopping-
at-value-strategy PBE. It is immediate to verify that at such an equilibrium, given the
properties of the mechanism we described, trade occurs whenever, given the informa-
tion acquired by the two agents, it is efficient.
In what follows we show that a shuttle diplomacy mechanism can be chosen so
that a stopping-at-value-PBE exists. Hence the mechanism is approximately ex-post
14 Note that the length of IBt – or I
S
t – and ∆ also determine how fine is the information being
acquired by a party. In the special case where, say, TB equals zero, the procedure does not entail any
discovery for the buyer. In such a case it must also be v∗ = 0.
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efficient. As the number of periods of the shuttle stage converges to infinity, that is,
as ∆ converges to zero, the information obtained by (at least one of the) parties gets
finer and finer and the mechanism becomes exactly ex-post efficient.15 We focus our
attention on this limit mechanism.
To establish the result we derive first the incentive compatibility conditions that the
speed of the discovery process, as described by
{
αSt
}TS
t=∆
,
{
αBt
}TB
t=∆
, and the dynamics
of the prices posted by the mediator must satisfy to ensure the optimality of a stopping-
at-value-strategy for both traders.
Note first that, to guarantee that both buyer and seller select to stop if they discover
their value in the last period TB and T S, in the limit as ∆→ 0, we must have:16
pB (v∗) = pF ≤ pS (v∗) if T S ≤ TB
pB (v∗) ≤ pF = pS (v∗) if T S ≥ TB
(5)
Together (4) and (5) imply that if T S = TB, then pF = p
B (v∗) = pS (v∗) = v∗.
We show in what follows that four other incentive compatibility conditions, two
for each agent, must be satisfied to guarantee the optimality of a stopping-at-value-
strategy also in any other period, before the final stage is reached. We consider the
buyer’s incentives first, assuming that the seller adopts a stopping-at-value strategy.
There are two cases to take into account at each point in time t < TB. From each case
we will derive an incentive constraint for the buyer.
The first incentive constraint for the buyer deals with the case in which at t the
15 We assume that, provided TS , TB > 0, lim∆→0 αSt−∆ = α
S
t and lim∆→0 α
B
t−∆ = α
B
t , that is, the
length of all intervals ISt , I
B
t converges to 0.
16 Suppose TS ≤ TB . Begin by considering the seller’s decision at TS when she has discovered
that her value is v∗; by (4) she will only trade in the event that the buyer’s value is at least as high
as v∗. If the seller decides to continue and this event occurs, so that the final period TB is reached,
she faces price pF . Hence, for the seller to prefer to stop we must have p
S (v∗) ≥ pF .
Now consider the buyer’s decision at t = TB . Assume, contrary to (5) that pB (v∗) 6= pF . Observe
that the seller is willing to trade at both prices. This is because the seller knows that vS ≤ v∗ and
(4) implies that the seller’s expected value satisfies EG0
[
vS | vS ≤ v∗] ≤ pB (v∗), while (3) implies
EG0
[
vS |vS ≤ v∗] ≤ pF . If pB (v∗) > pF , then in order to trade at a lower price the buyer has an
incentive to continue after discovering at t = TB that her value is v∗, since by (4) v∗ ≥ pB (v∗) and
trading is profitable. If, on the other hand, pB (v∗) < pF , then in order to trade at a lower price the
buyer has an incentive to stop at t = TB even if she has not discovered that her value is v∗, since by
(3) pF ≤ EF0
[
vB |vB ≥ v∗] and trading is profitable. Thus, it must be pB (v∗) = pF .
A similar argument holds when TS ≥ TB , implying that we must have pB (v∗) ≤ pF = pS (v∗).
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buyer has just discovered that her value is vBt . Since the seller up to this moment has
always selected to continue, her value must lie below αSt . Thus, if the buyer decides to
stop, her expected payoff is:
[
vBt − pB
(
vBt
)] G0 (vBt )
G0 (αSt )
.
Since by (4) in the final stage of the mechanism the seller accepts to trade at price
pB
(
vBt
)
when her value is below vBt , the term
G0(vBt )
G0(αSt )
is the buyers’ probability of
trading at this price, conditional on the seller’s value lying below αSt , and v
B
t −pB
(
vBt
)
is the gain from trade for the buyer.
If instead the buyer deviates and selects to continue, by (4) and (5) she can only
obtain a positive payoff (and hence possibly benefit from continuing) if she is the agent
stopping at a later date of the shuttle diplomacy stage. Several deviations of this kind
are possible. Consider first the buyer’s payoff when she decides to continue at t and to
stop in the next period, when the disclosed value is vBt+∆:
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[
vBt − pB
(
vBt+∆
)] G0 (vBt+∆)
G0 (αSt )
,
where vBt is the true buyer’s value, p
B
(
vBt+∆
)
is the price when stopping at time t+ ∆
and
G0(vBt+∆)
G0(αSt )
is the conditional probability at time t that the seller will have a value
below vBt+∆ and hence will not discover her value at time t+ ∆ and will want to trade
when the buyer stops at t+ ∆ with a presumed value vBt+∆.
18 To ensure this deviation
is not profitable, the following incentive constraint must hold for all t < T :
[
vBt − pB
(
vBt
)]
G0
(
vBt
) ≥ [vBt − pB (vBt+∆)]G0 (vBt+∆) .
Adding and subtracting pB
(
vBt+∆
)
G0
(
vBt
)
and rearranging, the constraint can be writ-
17 Note that if in period t+ ∆ the seller discovers that her values is vSt+∆, then trade does not take
place as pS(vSt+∆) > v
B
t by (4).
18 The event that the seller’s value is below vBt+∆ includes the event that in period t+ ∆ the seller
has not discovered her value to be vSt+∆, as by construction v
B
t+∆ ≤ v∗ ≤ vSt+∆.
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ten as:
[
pB
(
vBt+∆
)− vBt ] [G0 (vBt+∆)−G0 (vBt )]+ [pB (vBt+∆)− pB (vBt )]G0 (vBt ) ≥ 0.
Multiplying by
vBt+∆−vBt
∆
· 1
vBt+∆−vBt
, letting
dvBt
dt
= lim∆→0
vBt+∆−vBt
∆
, and taking limits as
∆→ 0, we obtain the following constraint for all vBt ∈ [0, v∗]:19[
dpB
(
vBt
)
dvBt
G0
(
vBt
)− (vBt − pB (vBt )) g0 (vBt )
]
dvBt
dt
≥ 0. (6)
Since by (4) vBt ≥ pB
(
vBt
)
, the term
(
vBt − pB
(
vBt
))
g0
(
vBt
)
dvBt is non negative.
It describes the expected benefit of the deviation for the buyer, given by the expected
payoff from the additional trades that can be completed by waiting one additional
period dt: vBt −pB
(
vBt
)
is the buyer’s payoff for each of these additional trades and the
unconditional probability of such additional trades is the limit as ∆→ 0 of G0
(
vBt+∆
)−
G0
(
vBt
)
, which equals g0
(
vBt
)
dvBt , the probability that the seller’s value lies in a small
interval around vBt . For the incentive constraint (6) to be satisfied, p
B
(
vBt
)
must be non
decreasing; that is, the buyer’s price must weakly increase over time. This generates a
loss for the buyer from waiting one additional period dt, due to an increase of the price
at which trade occurs. The first term in expression (6), dpB
(
vBt
)
G0
(
vBt
)
, is then the
buyer’s expected loss, due to a price increase, from waiting one additional period dt.
This loss occurs when the seller agrees to trade at pB
(
vBt
)
, as her value is below vBt ,
with G0
(
vBt
)
being the unconditional probability of this event.
To sum up, constraint (6) requires that when a buyer discovers her true value,
her loss due to a price increase if she deviates and waits one period before stopping
outweighs the gain due to an increase in the probability of trading. The larger the
buyer’s gain from trade vBt − pB
(
vBt
)
, the steeper must be the increase in pB
(
vBt
)
.
Lemma 4 in the appendix shows that (6) ensures that other deviations by the buyer,
to continuing for more than one period after the discovery of her value, are also not
19 By delaying stopping until the shuttle stage has reached the discovery of value v̂ > v a buyer with
value v obtains payoff
[
v − pB (v̂)]G0 (v̂). Constraint (6) says that the buyer’s payoff is decreasing in
v̂ at v̂ = v.
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profitable.
The second incentive constraint for the buyer refers to the case where in period t
the buyer has not yet discovered her value; thus the buyer knows that her value lies
above αBt and the seller knows that her value is below α
S
t . Considering again the limit
as ∆ → 0 (so that αBt = vBt and αSt = vSt ), the expected payoff of the buyer if she
deviates and stops the shuttle stage at t, is
(
EF0
[
vB|vB ≥ vBt
]− pB (vBt )) G0 (vBt )G0 (vSt ) .
If instead the buyer follows the stopping-at-value strategy and so chooses to continue
at t, her expected payoff at t is:
∫ v∗
vBt
(
vB − pB (vB)) G0 (vB)
G0 (vSt )
f0
(
vB
)
1− F0 (vBt )
dvB
+
(
EF0
[
vB | vB ≥ v∗]− pF ) 1− F0 (v∗)
1− F0 (vBt )
G0 (v
∗)
G0 (vSt )
+
∫ vSt
v∗
(
EF0
[
vB | vB ≥ vS]− pS (vS)) 1− F0 (vS)
1− F0 (vBt )
g0
(
vS
)
G0 (vSt )
dvS
In contrast to the previous case, since the buyer now has not yet discovered her
value and only knows it is greater than vBt , the buyer can achieve a positive expected
payoff in each of the three possible outcomes of the shuttle mechanism, as described
by the three terms in the above expression.
The first term is the expected payoff of the buyer in the event that the buyer will
stop the shuttle stage before time t = TB. If at time τ > t the buyer discovers that her
value is vB, which happens with probability
f0(vB)
1−F0(vBt )
dvB, and she then stops the shuttle
stage, she trades at price pB(vB) with probability
G0(vB)
G0(vSt )
, the conditional probability
at t that the seller’s value is below vB.
The second term is the expected payoff of the buyer if trade occurs at price pF ,
that is if buyer and seller continue the shuttle phase up to the end of the last period,
times the conditional probability at t of this event occurring. This happens when the
buyer value is above and the seller value below v∗.
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The third term is the buyer expected payoff in the last possible outcome, where it
is the seller to stop the shuttle stage before time t = T S. If at time τ > t the seller
discovers that her value is vS, which happens with probability
g0(vS)
G0(vSt )
dvS, and she stops
the shuttle stage, then the buyer trades at price pS(vS) with probability
1−F0(vS)
1−F0(vBt )
, the
conditional probability at t that the buyer’s value is above vS.
Thus we may conclude that continuing until her value has been discovered domi-
nates stopping for a buyer who has not discovered her value at t if and only if, for all
vBt ∈ [0, v∗], and associated vSt ∈ [v∗, 1],
(
EF0
[
vB|vB ≥ vBt
]− pB (vBt ))G0 (vBt ) (1− F0 (vBt ))
≤
∫ v∗
vBt
(
vB − pB (vB))G0 (vB) f0 (vB) dvB
+
(
EF0
[
vB | vB ≥ v∗]− pF ) (1− F0 (v∗))G0 (v∗) (7)
+
∫ vSt
v∗
(
EF0
[
vB | vB ≥ vS]− pS (vS)) (1− F0 (vS)) g0 (vS) dvS
To understand the above expression it is useful to compare it to the previous sit-
uation. Again, the benefit of stopping immediately at t the shuttle stage is to secure
a low price, while the benefit of waiting (following in this case the stopping-at-value
strategy) is a greater probability of trading. The difference is that, since now the buyer
only knows that vB ≥ vBt , instead of vB = vBt , the benefit of trading with a higher
probability, at a higher price, is higher. Unlike (6), to ensure that future gains are
always sufficiently large (7) imposes a condition on the continuation path of posted
prices as well as on the relative speed of the discovery processes, as revealed by the
fact that vSt appears in the constraint (together with the future path of prices posted
to the seller). If for example the seller’s discoveries up to time t have proceeded at the
same speed as the buyer’s discoveries, we have vSt = 1 − vBt , while if they have been
slower vSt > 1− vBt and if they have been faster vSt < 1− vBt .
We have shown that constraints (6) and (7) are necessary and sufficient for the
buyer’s strategy of stopping-at-value to be a best reply to the seller’s stopping-at-value
strategy in any period t < TB. We now state the incentive constraints for the seller’s
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stopping-at-value strategy to be a best reply to the buyer using a stopping-at-value
strategy at any t < T S. The first constraint is, for all vSt ∈ [v∗, 1] :[
dpS
(
vSt
)
dvSt
[
1− F0
(
vSt
)]− (pS (vSt )− vSt ) f0 (vSt )
](
−dv
S
t
dt
)
≥ 0. (8)
The derivation of (8) is analogous to the derivation of the corresponding constraint for
the buyer and is left to the appendix. The constraint implies that the price function
pS
(
vSt
)
is weakly increasing and hence the seller’s price weakly decreases over time. The
interpretation of the terms in (8) is similar to those in constraint (6): after discovering
her true value, the seller’s loss from continuing the shuttle stage, due to the decrease
in price, must outweigh the gain due to an increase in the probability of trading.
The second constraint is, for all vSt ∈ [v∗, 1] and associated vBt ∈ [0, v∗]:
(
pS
(
vSt
)− EG0 [vS | vS ≤ vSt ])G0 (vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt ))
≤
∫ vSt
v∗
(
pS
(
vS
)− vS) (1− F0((vS)) g0((vS) dvS
+
(
pF − EG0
[
vS | vS ≤ v∗]) (1− F0 (v∗))G0 (v∗) (9)
+
∫ v∗
vBt
(
pB
(
vB
)− EG0 [vS | vS ≤ vB])G0 (vB) f0 (vB) dvB
Again, the interpretation of the terms appearing in (9) is similar to the one of the terms
in the corresponding constraint (7) for the buyer: (9) says that, after a discovery round
in which the seller does not discover her true value, her payoff from stopping, given by
the left hand side of (9), is smaller than the payoff from following the stopping-at-value
strategy, the right hand side of (9). The benefit of a higher probability of trading when
continuing must exceed the loss due to a decrease in the price at which trade occurs.
We summarize the analysis so far in this section with the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If the final buyer and seller value v∗ and posted price pF , together with the
continuously differentiable price functions pB (v), pS (v) satisfy constraints (3) – (9),
then in the limit as ∆ → 0 the shuttle-diplomacy mechanism has a stopping-at-value
strategy PBE.
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We now present the main result of this section:
Proposition 2 There are continuously differentiable price functions pB (v) and pS (v),
speeds of learning in the discovery process dvS/dt, dvB/dt, a final value v∗ for the buyer
and the seller and price pF for which, as the length of the discovery periods converges
to zero, the shuttle diplomacy mechanism has a stopping-at-value-strategy PBE. That
is, it is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for agents to stop the shuttle stage if and only
if they have discovered their value and to trade when profitable. The resulting trading
outcome is ex-post efficient.
We establish the result using an extreme form of the shuttle diplomacy mechanism,
in which one party does not learn any information in the discovery process, while
the other party progressively learns everything about her true value. That is, the
mediator only takes a single shuttle ride to each of the two parties and does not go
back and forth between them. For concreteness, let the seller be the party that makes
a discovery in every period of the shuttle stage and then selects whether or not to stop,
while the buyer only learns something about her value in the final stage, and this is the
minimum information needed to implement ex-post efficient trading. This amounts to
setting TB = 0, v∗ = 0. It then follows from (5) that pB (0) = 0. As we shall see,
all the incentive constraints are satisfied if the seller price is selected so as to give the
seller all the gains from trade.
Proof of Proposition 2 Set (i) v∗ = 0; (ii) TB = 0 and αSt = 1 − t for all
t = ∆, 2∆, .., T S = 1; (iii) pB (0) = 0, pS
(
vS
)
= EF0
[
vB|vB ≥ vS] and pF = EF0 [vB].
It is immediate to see that (3), (4) and (5) hold. Furthermore, since TB = 0 we can
ignore the two incentive constraints of the buyer along the shuttle stage, (6) and (7).
Condition (8) holds since, under the stated specification pS
(
vSt
)
= EF0
[
vB | vB ≥ vSt
]
we have:
pS
(
vSt
) [
1− F0
(
vSt
)]
=
∫ 1
vSt
vf0 (v) dv (10)
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and therefore
dpS
(
vSt
)
dvSt
[
1− F0
(
vSt
)]− (pS (vSt )− vSt ) f0 (vSt ) = 0.
Finally, in the case under consideration condition (9) can be rewritten as:
(
pS
(
vSt
)− EG0 [vS | vS ≤ vSt ])G0 (vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt ))
≤
∫ vSt
0
(
pS
(
vS
)− vS) (1− F0 (vS)) g0 (vS) dvS, or
∫ vSt
0
(
pS
(
vSt
) [
1− F0
(
vSt
)]− pS (vS) [1− F0 (vS)]) g0 (vS) dvS
≤
∫ vSt
0
(
vS
[
1− F0
(
vSt
)]− vS [1− F0 (vS)]) g0 (vS) dvS
By (10), this inequality can be rewritten as follows:
∫ vSt
0
(∫ 1
vSt
vf0 (v) dv −
∫ 1
vS
vf0 (v) dv
)
g0
(
vS
)
dvS ≤
∫ vSt
0
vS
[
F0
(
vS
)− F0 (vSt )] g0 (vS) dvS
and hence reduces to:
∫ vSt
0
∫ vSt
vS
vf0 (v) dvg0
(
vS
)
dvS ≥
∫ vSt
0
vS
[
F0
(
vSt
)− F0 (vS)] g0 (vS) dvS ,
which clearly holds.
The proof of the proposition then follows from Lemma 2. 
Proposition 2 establishes the existence of a shuttle-diplomacy mechanism, in the
limit as the length ∆ of the discovery intervals approaches 0, that guarantees that the
parties trade whenever it is ex-post efficient to do so. The proof of the proposition uses
the fact that informing one party only and choosing the price at any t so as to give
the informed party all the gains from trade induces her to play the stopping-at-value
strategy, as it aligns her private incentives with the social goal.
Equity concerns may raise doubts about the desirability (and practical feasibility)
30
of a solution, as in the proof, where the mediator proposes a procedure in which one
party obtains all the gains from trade. From an ex-ante perspective, these concerns
could be dealt with by modifying the procedure and flipping a fair coin that determines
the agent to be fully informed. With such a modification the gains from trade would be
equally split from an ex-ante point of view. While of clear theoretical interest, however,
such a mechanism does not accord with the common practice of mediation, in which
gains of trade are typically split somewhat evenly ex post. With a markedly unequal
distribution of the ex-post gains from trade, the interpretation of the evaluative role of
the mediator as allowing to enforce the commitment of the parties to acquire limited
information is in particular problematic. After the coin has been flipped and, say, the
seller has been selected as the party obtaining all the gains from trade, why should the
buyer want to stick to her commitment to mediation? It is thus important to show,
as we do in the next subsection when we study the case of uniform prior distributions,
that it is typically possible to design shuttle diplomacy mechanisms which are ex-post
efficient, but where the extent as well as the speed of learning in the shuttle stage are
similar for the two parties and the ex-post gains from trade are split more equitably.
To conclude this section, we provide some further explanation of why a shuttle
diplomacy mechanism allows to realize all gains from trade, while this is not possible
with a static Bayesian mechanism when agents are fully informed about their own
values. The shuttle diplomacy mechanism allows the mediator to find out whether
trading is optimal, either because the shuttle phase reaches v∗ (in which case both
agents know trade is efficient), or because one agent discovers her value and the other
discovers whether trade is optimal. Unlike in static Bayesian mechanisms, the mediator
may then set a price at which trade occurs if and only if there are positive gains from
trade.
To understand why this is possible, notice first that with shuttle diplomacy when
trade occurs at most one party is fully informed about her value, while the other party
is provided with the minimal information needed to ensure that trade is efficient. Lim-
iting the information available to parties slackens the agents’ incentive constraints and
makes it easier, as we saw in the previous section, to induce parties to trade. Second,
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information is provided slowly over time by the mediator and this also affects parties’
incentives to truthfully report their private information, as it limits the available lies.
Consider the buyer and suppose her true value is v. The buyer can only falsely report
a lower value v′ < v by stopping the discovery stage at v′, that is when all she knows
is that her value is greater than the v′; fine tuning her misreport of a low value to
depend on the true one as in a static setting with full information cannot be done.20
Third, the fact that the report sent by an agent not only affects the terms of trade
but also the information provided to parties in the subsequent periods reduces the
agents’ incentives to conceal and lie about their own values. Indeed, a key feature of
our mechanism is that the report sent by each agent over the discoveries made at any
point in time (via her decision to stop or continue) allows the mediator to correlate
the information that is made available to the parties, without violating the privacy
constraints, and this makes it easier to satisfy the incentive constraints. We must
stress that this endogenous correlation is exploited to achieve first best efficiency by
our information disclosure and trading mechanism in quite a different way from how
the side-betting, trading mechanisms of Cre´mer and McLean (1988) exploit exogenous
correlation among buyers’ values to obtain full surplus extraction by a seller.
4.1 The Case of Uniform Prior Distributions
In this section we show that when the buyer and seller’s value distributions are uniform,
F0 (v) = G0 (v) = v, a continuum of price functions and identical discovery speeds for
the buyer and the seller exist that induce them to use stopping-at-value strategies and
generate ex post efficient trading. While special, this result can be generalized beyond
the uniform case, as we argue in Section 5.
Given the symmetry of the value distributions, it is natural to start by taking as
stopping value for seller and buyer v∗ = 1
2
and equal sized discovery intervals. That is,
we assume: αBt =
t
2
, αSt = 1− t2 , for t = ∆, .., 1. This implies that for all t, vSt = 1−vBt .
20 This effect is also present in the sequential disclosure policy in Bergemann and Wambach (2015),
in which a profit maximizing seller lets a buyer learn a progressively higher lower bound on her value
for the item for sale.
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It is then natural to assume symmetry in the prices posted by the mediator, considering
price functions that are linked as follows:
pS
(
vSt
)
= pS
(
1− vBt
)
= 1− pB (vBt ) (11)
Henceforth in this subsection, we will simplify the notation and denote the buyer’s
value by v, dropping the superscript B and subscript t.
It is simple to check that under the above specification the incentive constraints
of buyer and seller are identical; that is, the constraints in the following pairs are
equivalent: the first two and the last two inequalities in (4); (6) and (8); (7) and (9).
Condition (4) then reduces to:
v
2
≤ pB (v) ≤ v, (12)
The only additional constraint imposed by (3), (4) and (5) is a symmetric final price:
pB
(
1
2
)
= pF =
1
2
. (13)
The first incentive constraint of the buyer, (6) (or (8) for the seller), reduces to:
d
(
pB (v) v
)
dv
≥ v. (14)
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The second incentive constraint of the buyer, (7) ((9) for the seller), becomes:21
pB(v)v(1− v) ≥ v
2
− v
3
3
− 1
12
(15)
Thus, to guarantee that stopping-at-value strategies constitute a symmetric PBE
when the price function is pB(v), pB(v) must satisfy constraints (12) – (15).
Consider the following candidate price function:
pBH (v) = v,
which satisfies the right constraint in (12) as an equality. This specification of the price
function penalizes the first trader to discover her value (either the buyer with a value
below v∗ = pF = 12 or the seller with a value above v
∗, the one among them with the
value furthest away from pF ), as such trader makes a zero payoff. All the gains from
trade go to the other party. The incentives of an agent when she learns her value, (14),
are then clearly satisfied. So is (13). It is then immediate to verify that the agent
prefers not to stop when she has not yet learnt her value, that is (15) also holds, since
her gains accrue when it is the other agent to make a discovery in the future. Hence,
under this price function stopping-at-value is a PBE and the equilibrium outcome is
ex-post efficient trade.
21 Recalling from (11) that vS = 1− vB and pB (v) = 1− pS (1− v), (7) can be written as:(
1 + v
2
− pB(v)
)
v(1− v) ≤
∫ 1
2
v
(
vB − pB (vB)) vBdvB + (1 + 12
2
− 1
2
)
1
4
+
∫ 1
2
v
(
1 + 1− vB
2
− (1− pB (vB))) vBdvB ,
which is equivalent to:(
1 + v
2
− pB(v)
)
v(1− v) ≤
∫ 1
2
v
(
vB
2
)
vBdvB +
1
16
or,
1
2
v(1− v2)− pB(v)v(1− v) ≤ 1
6
(
1
8
− v3
)
+
1
16
,
which equals (15).
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On the contrary, the function that satisfies the left constraint in (12) as an equality
(i.e., pB (v) = v
2
), attributing all gains from trade to the agent reporting a discovery, is
not admissible since it violates constraint (13) and also, as we shall see in what follows,
(15) for v close to 1
2
. We may however define a price function pBL (v) equal to
v
2
for low
values of v and implicitly defined by (15) holding as an equality for high values of v.
We can do so because there exists a unique v̂ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
such that for v = v̂ it is
v2(1− v)
2
=
v
2
− v
3
3
− 1
12
while the left hand side is greater than the right hand side for v < v̂ and smaller for
v > v̂.22 Thus
pBL (v) =
 v2 for v ∈ [0, v̂]6v−4v3−1
12v(1−v) for v ∈
[
v̂, 1
2
]
By construction, pBL (v) satisfies (13), (15) and the left constraint in (12) for v ≤ v̂.
By the argument in footnote 22 this last constraint is also satisfied for v > v̂. To
establish that pBL (v) is a solution it remains to check that it satisfies (14) and the right
constraint in (12). It is immediate to see that for v ≤ v̂ dpBL (v)v
dv
= v and hence (14) is
satisfied. Simple algebra shows that: (i)
d
(
6v−4v3−1
12(1−v)
)
dv
> v and thus (14) holds for v ≥ v̂;
(ii) 6v−4v
3−1
12v(1−v) < v for v ∈
[
0, 1
2
)
and thus the right constraint in (12) is also satisfied.
When pB(v) = pBL (v), an agent makes most of her gains when she makes a discovery.
This again ensures the agent does not want to delay stopping the process when she
learns her value. On the other hand, giving all the benefits from trade to the agent
who reports a discovery may induce an agent to lie when she has not made a discovery,
to profit from the price posted in that case. The above argument shows this indeed
happens when v is sufficiently close to v∗, hence the need to adjust the price to reduce
the gains accruing to the party reporting a discovery.
It is immediate to see that any convex combination defined by:
p(v) = λpBH (v) + (1− λ)pBL (v) , (16)
22 Define Ψ(v) = v
2(1−v)
2 − v2 + v
3
3 +
1
12 . Note that Ψ(0) > 0, Ψ
(
1
2
)
< 0 and dΨ(v)dv < 0 for v ∈
[
0, 12
]
.
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with λ ∈ [0, 1] is also admissible as all constraints (12) – (15) are satisfied. We have
thus proven the following:
Proposition 3 With uniform prior distributions F0 (v) = G0 (v) = v, there exist a
continuum of functions p
(
vB
)
:
[
0, 1
2
]→ [0, 1
2
]
such that it is a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium for agents to adopt stopping-at-value strategies in a shuttle diplomacy mechanism
where the buyer and the seller discover their values at the same speed, with pF = v
∗ = 1
2
,
and the price functions are pB
(
vB
)
= p(vB) and pS
(
vS
)
= 1− p (1− vS).
The shuttle-diplomacy mechanisms described above, with prices in the class defined
by (16), are ex-ante symmetric and feature the same pattern of information provision
to buyer and seller in the shuttle stage. They also guarantee equal split ex-post of the
expected gains from trade if the buyer’s value is above and the seller’s cost is below
v∗ = pF = 12 . On the other hand, it is easy to see that a completely equal ex-post
split of the gains from trade is impossible, as it would require a price function equal
to pB (v) = 3
4
v, which violates the incentive compatibility constraint (15) for v close to
1/2 as well as (13).
5 Extensions
5.1 Generalizing the Uniform Case
To check the robustness of the characterization of the optimal mechanisms in Propo-
sition 3, an instructive and easily computable generalization is to the case where the
prior density functions of buyer and seller are identical and piecewise linear, with a
peak or trough at v = 1
2
. That is, we consider:
f0(v) = g0(v) =
 1−
β
4
+ βv for v ∈ [0, 1
2
]
1 + 3β
4
− βv for v ∈ [1
2
, 1
] (17)
for some constant β that can be positive or negative but is anyway close to 0. At
v = 1
2
, f0(v) = g0(v) has a trough if β < 0 and a peak if β > 0. The value distributions
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remain identical and symmetric around 1/2, as in the case of uniform distributions
(which obtain as a special case, when β = 0). We maintain then the same assumptions
about the learning speeds and the symmetry of the price functions with pF = v
∗ = 1
2
.
We will again consider two extreme candidate price functions. The first one is
pBH(v) = v, the same as for the uniform case and the unique price function for which
the second inequality constraint in (4) binds. The second price function, denoted by
pBLβ (v), is a generalization of the function p
B
L (v) considered in the uniform case. The
function pBLβ (v) is implicitly defined by the first inequality constraint in (4) being
satisfied as an equality for values v ∈ [0, v̂β] and constraint (7) being satisfied as an
equality for values v ∈ [v̂β, 12]. As in the definition of pBL (v), v̂β is the unique value at
which both the first inequality constraint in (4) and constraint (7) hold as equalities.
We will show that pBH(v) = v is admissible, in the sense that it satisfies all incentive
constraints, if and only if the density has a peak at v = 1
2
, while pBLβ (v) is admissible
irrespective of whether the density has a peak or a trough.
Consider first pBH(v) = v. It is immediate to see that the same argument as in
Section 4.1 ensures that (3), (4), (5), (6) hold. Hence the only condition we need to
check is the incentive constraint (7), which for pB(v) = v can be written as:
(∫ 1
v
xf0(x)dx− v [1− F0(v)]
)
G0(v) ≤
(∫ 1
1
2
xf0(x)dx− 1
2
[
1− F0
(
1
2
)])
G0
(
1
2
)
+
∫ 1−v
1
2
(∫ 1
y
xf0(x)dx− y [1− F0(y)]
)
g0(y)dy,
which, integrating by parts, becomes:
∫ 1
v
[1− F0(x)] dxG0 (v)−
∫ 1
1
2
[1− F0 (x)] dxG0
(
1
2
)−∫ 1−v
1
2
∫ 1
y
[1− F0 (x)] dxg0 (y) dy ≤ 0
Denote the left hand side of the above inequality by ΦBH(v). The proof of the
following lemma is in the appendix.
Lemma 3 ΦBH (v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈
[
0, 1
2
]
if and only if β ≥ 0.
Thus, pBH(v) = v is admissible and allows to attain an ex-post efficient outcome
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when the prior densities are identical, piecewise linear and symmetric around 1
2
, if they
have a peak at v = 1
2
(i.e., if β ≥ 0) but not if they have a trough (β < 0). For an
intuitive explanation of this result, recall that with the price function pBH(v) a buyer
that uses a stopping-at-value strategy obtains a positive payoff only when her value is
greater than both 1
2
and the seller’s value. To stop before having discovered her value
allows the buyer to trade at a lower price at the cost of a smaller trading probability.
When the buyer has discovered that her value is above 1
2
− , that is, it is in a small
left neighborhood of v = 1
2
, the price gain of stopping is approximately  and the
reduction in trading probability is approximately f0
(
1
2
)
, which is the probability that
the seller’s value is between 1
2
−  and 1
2
. Thus, the reduction in trading probability
when the buyer stops before having discovered her value is lower if the density function
has a trough at v = 1
2
than if it has a peak.23
We now consider the price function pBLβ (v). Note that p
B
Lβ
(v) is continuous in
β and converges pointwise to pBL (v) as β converges to 0. In addition, p
B
Lβ
(
1
2
)
= 1
2
.
The properties of pBL (v) derived in the previous section then readily imply that, for
sufficiently low β, pBLβ (v) satisfies the first inequality constraint in (4) and constraints
(7), (3) and (5). Thus, to establish that pBLβ (v) is admissible it only remains to check
that it satisfies (6) and the second inequality constraint in (4). Constraint (6) is
satisfied for v ≤ v̂β, since
dpBLβ
(v)G0(v)
dv
= vg0(v). That (6) is also satisfied for v ≥ v̂β
follows from pBLβ (v) being continuous in β, converging pointwise to p
B
L (v) =
6v−4v3−1
12v(1−v)
and the fact that
d
(
6v−4v3−1
12(1−v)
)
dv
> v (i.e.,
dpBL (v)v
dv
> v and thus (6) holding strictly for
pBL (v)). Finally, the fact that p
B
L (v) =
6v−4v3−1
12v(1−v) < v implies that for small β the second
inequality constraint in (4) is satisfied for v < 1
2
, while the property that it is satisfied
at v = 1
2
follows from pBLβ
(
1
2
)
= 1
2
.
5.2 Single-Disclosure Shuttle Diplomacy
In this subsection we show that the mediator could obtain the same ex-post efficient
outcome as in the mechanism considered in the proof of Proposition 2, with all gains
23 A symmetric argument holds for the seller.
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from trade going to the seller, if she used a modification of the shuttle-diplomacy
procedure. We call this modified procedure the single-disclosure shuttle-diplomacy
mechanism. Such a mechanism is specified as follows: the mediator lets the seller fully
observe her value in one round, asks her to report it, lets the buyer observe whether
her value is above or below the value reported by the seller, and posts a price at which
both buyer and seller decide to trade only if the buyer discovers to have a value above
the value reported by the seller. It is clear that if the seller sends a truthful report
about her value, this mechanism also allows to attain an ex-post efficient outcome.
The incentive constraint of the seller is however different from the constraints in the
mechanism considered in the proof of Proposition 2, since the set of strategies available
to her is different. The seller now makes a single report after having observed her
value, while in the shuttle-diplomacy procedure considered in the proof of Proposition
2 discoveries take place slowly over time and the seller must make reports which are
simpler – stop or continue – but are taken repeatedly along the way, before and after
having discovered her true value. Hence a new argument is needed to establish a result
analogous to Proposition 2. Before proceeding, however, it is worth repeating that the
interpretation of the role of the mediator as an agent that allows parties to commit to
acquiring limited information is problematic when all the ex post gains from trade go
to one party. Why would the other party want to honor her commitment?
To see that a single-discovery shuttle diplomacy procedure can be constructed to
induce efficient trading, observe that in such a mechanism the payoff of a seller who
reports v̂S while her true value is vS is:
uS
(
v̂S; vS
)
=
[
pS
(
v̂S
)− vS] [1− F0 (v̂S)]
Let uS
(
vS
)
= uS
(
vS; vS
)
be the seller’s indirect utility function when sincere re-
porting, v̂S = vS, is optimal. The first order condition of the seller’s maximization
problem requires that
duS
(
vS
)
dvS
= − [1− F0 (vS)]
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or, integrating both sides from vS to 1 and using the boundary condition uS(1) = 0:
[
pS
(
vS
)− vS] [1− F0 (vS)] = uS (vS) = ∫ 1
vS
[
1− F0
(
v˜S
)]
dv˜S.
Integrating by parts and rearranging we obtain
pS
(
vS
)
=
∫ 1
vS
v˜S
1− F0 (vS)dF0
(
v˜S
)
= EF0
[
vB|vB ≥ vS] .
Note that this is the same price function as the one used in the proof of Proposition
2; it gives all the gains from trade to the seller.
We thus have shown that in the single-discovery shuttle diplomacy mechanism,
pS
(
vS
)
= EF0
[
vB|vB ≥ vS] is the only price function that guarantees the incentive
compatibility of truthful reporting of her value by the seller. Also note that it is a
strictly dominant continuation strategy for the seller to accept to trade at the posted
price, while the buyer is also willing to trade when her value is above the seller’s as
she obtains a zero payoff either way. Given this, it is always optimal for the seller to
report sincerely. As argued, above this ensures that trade occurs whenever it is ex-post
efficient. We have thus established the following:
Proposition 4 Under the single-discovery shuttle diplomacy mechanism, there exists
a unique price function pS
(
vS
)
= EF0
[
vB|vB ≥ vS] such that it is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium for the seller to sincerely report her value and for buyer and seller to accept
to trade at the posted price when it is ex-post efficient to trade.24
6 Conclusions
Psychologists have argued that mediators help parties to overcome psychological bar-
riers to conflict resolution. We have argued that a mediator will also help when parties
are rational, strategic negotiators.
24 It is obvious that an analogous ex-post efficient, single-discovery shuttle diplomacy procedure
giving all the gains from trade to the buyer could be constructed.
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The approach adopted in this paper may be described as an information disclosure
and allocation mechanism design approach. Both the private information disclosed to
agents and the trading protocol are chosen by a designer, in our case the mediator.
The approach blends the classical mechanism design approach with the information
design, or Bayesian persuasion, approach. In classical mechanism design, agents have
full private information and the designer only selects a procedure to determine the
allocation as a function of the information reported by the parties. In information
design, the allocation mechanism is exogenously fixed and the designer may only select
the information disclosure policy.
We have shown that some amount of obfuscation is optimal: it is best for efficiency
not to give full information to all parties as this allows to increase the probability that a
settlement is reached. We also showed that dynamic procedures, whereby information
is progressively revealed to the parties, and parties send reports which affect both the
terms of a possible transaction and the future flow of information, allow to further
increase the welfare gains that are realized. In the case we consider, concerning the
possibility of trading an object between two parties, a first best outcome is achieved,
where all ex-post gains from trade are realized with the optimal dynamic mechanism.
We believe that the approach considered in this paper could be fruitfully applied to
other settings, beyond the case of the transaction between two parties we considered.
41
References
[1] Bergemann, D. and S. Morris, 2005, “Robust Mechanism Design,” Econometrica,
73(6): 1771–1813.
[2] Bergemann D., and S. Morris, 2019, “Information Design: A Unified Perspective,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 57(1): 44–95.
[3] Bergemann, D. and M. Pesendorfer, 2007, “Information Structures in Optimal
Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 137 (1): 580-609.
[4] Bergemann, D. and A. Wambach, 2015, “Sequential Information Disclosure in
Auctions, ” Journal of Economic Theory, 159: 1074-1095.
[5] Brown, J.G. and I. Ayres, 1994, “Economic Rationales for Mediation,”Virginia
Law Review, 80(2): 323–402.
[6] Carbone, M.P., 2019, “Mediation Strategies: A Lawyer’s Guide To Successful
Negotiation, ”available at https://www.mediate.com/articles/carbone7.cfm.
[7] Chatterjee K. and W. Samuelson, 1983, “Bargaining under Incomplete Informa-
tion,” Operations Research, Vol. 31(5): 835-851.
[8] Condorelli, D. and B. Szentes, 2019, “Information design in the hold-up problem,”
Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
[9] Cˇopicˇ, J., 2017, “Optimal Robust Bilateral Trade: Bid-ask Spread,” Working
paper.
[10] Cˇopicˇ, J. and C. Ponsat´ı, 2016, “Optimal Robust Bilateral Trade: Risk neutrality,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 163(5): 276 – 287.
[11] Cre´mer, J. and R. P. McLean, 1988, “Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian
and Dominant Strategy Auctions,” Econometrica, 56: 1247-1257.
[12] Doornik, K 2014, “A Rationale for Mediation and its Optimal Use,” International
Review of Law and Economics, 38: 1–10.
[13] Eso¨, P. and B. Szentes, 2007, “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and
the Handicap Auction,” Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), 705-731.
42
[14] Goltsman, M., J. Ho¨rner, G. Pavlov and F, Squintani, 2009, “Mediation, Arbitra-
tion and Negotiation,” Journal of Economic Theory, 144: 1397–1420.
[15] Hagerty, K. M. and W. P. Rogerson, 1987, “Robust Trading Mechanisms,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 42: 94–107.
[16] Heumann, T, 2019, “Information Design and Sequential Screening with Ex Post
Participation Constraint, ” Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
[17] Kamenica, E., and M. Gentzkow, 2011, “Bayesian Persuasion,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 101: 2590-2615.
[18] Kolotilin, A., Mylovanov, T., Zapechelnyuk, A. and M. Li, 2017, “Persuasion of a
Privately Informed Receiver,” Econometrica, 85(6): 1949-64.
[19] Kra¨hmer, D.S, 2018, “Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design with Infor-
mation Disclosure, ” Working paper. University of Bonn.
[20] Li, F. and P. Norman, 2018, “Sequential Persuasion, ” available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2952606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2952606.
[21] Li., H. and X. Shi, 2017, “Discriminatory Information Disclosure,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 107 (11): 3363-85.
[22] Mezzetti, C., 2019, “Decision and Information Disclosure Mechanism Design,” in
Laslier, J.-F., Moulin, H., Sanver, M.R. and W.S. Zwicker (eds), The Future of
Economic Design, Springer.
[23] Myerson, R.B. and M.A. Satterthwaite, 1983, “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral
Trading,”Journal of Economic Theory, 29 (2): 265–281.
[24] National Arbitration and Mediation, 2019, “Mediation in 2019: “All-
Star” Panel Of Mediators Share Advice & Experiences,”available at
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/mediation-in-2019-all-star-panel-of-13031/
[25] Pissler, K.B., 2013, “Mediation in China: Threat to the Rule of Law?, ”in Hopt,
K.J. and F. Steffek (eds.), Mediation, Oxford University Press, 960–988.
43
[26] Rayo, L. and I, Segal 2010,“Optimal Information Disclosure, ”Journal of Political
Economy, 118 (5): 949–87.
[27] Roesler, A.K. and B. Szentes, 2017, “Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pric-
ing,”American Economic Review, 107 (7): 2072-80.
[28] Smartsettle, 2017, “Facilitative vs. Evaluative Mediation ”, available at
https://smartsettle.com/2017/03/29/facilitative-vs-evaluative-mediation/
44
Appendix
In this appendix we present results and proofs omitted from the main body of the
paper.
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose p, F,G are maximizers of (1). We show in what
follows that p and the following two point distributions are also maximizers of (1). For
buyers, take the distribution that puts mass 1−RF (p) on vBL = EF [v|v < p] and mass
RF (p) on v
B
H = EF [v|v ≥ p]. For sellers, take the distribution that puts mass G(p) on
vSL = EG[v|v ≤ p] and mass 1−G(p) on vSH = EG[v|v > p]. It is then immediate to see
that the expression in (1), evaluated at the solution p, F,G, is equal to:
(
vBH − vSL
)
RF (p)G(p),
that is, to the value of (1) at the two-point distributions described above. Note that
if F ∈ F the specified two-point distribution for the buyer also belongs to F , and
similarly for the seller. This shows that, in solving her maximization problem, the
mediator may restrict attention to two-point discrete distributions. 
Proof of Proposition 1 To establish the result, we characterize first the classes of
feasible two-point signal distributions. For buyers, let {vBL , vBH} be the set of possible
signals with associated probabilities fL, fH = 1 − fL. The following constraints must
hold to guarantee that F0 is a mean preserving spread of the signal distribution:
vBL fL + v
B
H (1− fL) = vB0 (18)(
x− vBL
)
fL ≤
∫ x
0
F0(v)dv for x ∈ [vBL , vBH) (19)(
vBH − vBL
)
fL +
(
x− vBH
) ≤ ∫ x
0
F0(v)dv for x ∈
[
vBH , 1
]
(20)
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We can then solve (18) for vBL and replace the obtained solution into the other two
constraints:
(x− vBH)fL − vB0 + vBH −
∫ x
0
F0(v)dv ≤ 0 for x ∈ [vBL , vBH) (21)
x− vB0 −
∫ x
0
F0(v)dv ≤ 0 for x ∈
[
vBH , 1
]
(22)
It is immediate to see that (22) holds since, integrating by parts,
x− vB0 −
∫ x
0
F0(v)dv = x[1− F0(x)]− vB0 +
∫ x
0
vdF0(v)
= xRF0(x)−
∫ 1
x
vdF0(v) ≤ 0.
It is also immediate to see that the left hand side of (21) is a concave function of x.
Define xB as the solution to fL = F0(x). There are three possible cases.
Case 1: xB ∈ [vBL , vBH ]. Then the left hand side of (21) is maximized at xB and condition
(21) holds if it is satisfied for x = xB. Hence we can rewrite this condition as:
(x− vBH)F0(x)− vB0 + vBH − xF0(x) +
∫ x
0
vdF0(v) ≤ 0 or,
vBHRF0(x)−
∫ 1
x
vdF0(v) ≤ 0 (23)
Condition (23) is quite intuitive: it says that the value of the buyer when she receives
the high signal, vBH , cannot exceed the expected value of the buyer, conditional on this
value lying above some threshold x, evaluated according to the posterior distribution
F0.
Case 2: xB < vBL , that is the two point signal distribution is such that F (v
B
L ) > fL. In
this case the left hand side of (21) is maximized at x = vBL , hence condition (21) can
be rewritten as:
−
∫ x
0
F0(v)dv ≤ 0,
and is always satisfied.
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Case 3: xB > vBH , the two point signal distribution is such that fL > F (v
B
H). The
expression on the left hand side of (21) is now maximized at x = vBH and we can
rewrite (21) as:
−vB0 + vBH −
∫ vBH
0
F0(v)dv ≤ 0, (24)
which we can also show always to hold.25
We may repeat the same argument for the seller, letting {vSL, vSH} be the set of possible
signals with probabilities gL, gH , with v
S
LgL + v
S
HgH = v
S
0 and the counterparts of (21)
and (22). Using y instead of x, we see that the left hand side of the counterpart of
(21) is a concave function of y. The expression on the left hand side of the constraint
reaches then the highest value either at y equal to vSL or v
S
H , in which case the constraint
is always satisfied, or at y such that gL = G0(y), in which case the constraint can be
rewritten as:
vSHRG0(y)−
∫ 1
y
vdG0(v) ≤ 0 or,∫ y
0
vdG0(v)− vSLG0(y) ≤ 0 (25)
We can then use Lemma 1 and the characterization we obtained of two-point signal
distributions to rewrite the mediator’s problem, (1). As we said, a mediator aiming
to maximize the gains from trade will choose distributions and a price such that the
buyer is willing to trade when he gets the high signal and the seller with the low signal,
that is: vBH ≥ p ≥ vSL. Also, we can show that the situation described in Cases 2 and 3
above never arises at a solution of the mediator’s problem,26 hence neither constraint
25 We can in fact rewrite (24) as
−vB0 + vBH
[
1− F0(vBH)
]
+
∫ vBH
0
vdF0(v) ≤ 0 or,
vBH
[
1− F0(vBH)
]− ∫ 1
vBH
vdF0(v) ≤ 0,
which always holds.
26 Consider the information provided to the buyer. Suppose first the solution of the mediator’s
problem falls in Case 2. Then F (vBL ) > fL = F (x
B) and it is possible to raise the gains from trade
by keeping fL constant, reducing v
B
L and increasing v
B
H while satisfying the only binding constraint
vBL fL + v
B
H (1− fL) = vB0 , a contradiction. Second, suppose the solution falls in Case 3. We have
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(23) nor (25) can be ignored, and we can replace the choice variables fL and gL with
F0(x) and G0(y). The mediator problem (1) can then be rewritten as follows:
max
vH ,cL,x,y
(
vBH − vSL
)
G0(y)RF0(x) s.t. (26)
vBHRF0(x) + v
B
LF0(x) = v
B
0
vBHRF0(x)−
∫ 1
x
vdF0(v) ≤ 0
vSHRG0(y) + v
S
LG0(y) = v
S
0∫ y
0
vdG0(v)− vSLG0(y) ≤ 0
Furthermore, it is immediate to see that both inequality constraints must bind, oth-
erwise the mediator would profit from raising vBH or lowering v
S
L. Hence, substituting
the constraints into the objective function, the problem reduces to:
max
x,y
(
EF0 [vB|vB ≥ x]− EG0 [vS|vS ≤ y]
)
G0(y)RF0(x) (27)
The interpretation of (27) is as follows. The fact that the two constraints in (26) hold
as equality means that the mediator lets the buyer observe exactly whether her value is
greater than or equal to x and lets the seller observe whether her value is smaller than
or equal to y. Trade takes place when both events realize, as ensured by posting any
price p ∈ [EG0 [vS|vS ≤ y],EF0 [vB|vB ≥ x]] . The values of x and y are then optimally
chosen to maximize expected gains from trade.
The final step of the proof is then to characterize the solutions of program (27). Since
the domain of (x, y) is compact (the unit square) and the objective function and con-
straints are continuous in x and y, program (27) has a solution. Setting x = 1 or
y = 0 cannot be optimal, as it yields a zero payoff to the mediator, which is less than
the payoff that could be achieved by setting 0 < x = y < 1. Thus the only possible
so F (vBH) < fL = F (x
B). If xB < 1 it is again possible to raise the gains from trade by keeping fL
constant, reducing vBL and increasing v
B
H while satisfying v
B
L fL + v
B
H (1− fL) = vB0 , a contradiction.
If instead xB = 1, then fL = 1 and with probability 1 there is no trade; this is also a contradiction as
full disclosure and any interior posted price p ∈ (0, 1) would generate positive gains from trade.
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boundary solutions have x = 0 and/or y = 1.
Since F0 and G0 have no atoms, the first order conditions of program (27), taking into
account the constraints x ≥ 0 and 1− y ≥ 0, are:
−xf0(x)G0(y) +
∫ y
0
vdG0(v)f0(x) ≤ 0(
−xf0(x)G0(y) +
∫ y
0
vdG0(v)f0(x)
)
x = 0∫ 1
x
vdF0(v)g0(y)− yg0(y)RF0(x) ≥ 0(∫ 1
x
vdF0(v)g0(y)− yg0(y)RF0(x)
)
(1− y) = 0
Note that if x = 0, the first inequality is violated, as the term on the left hand side is
strictly positive. Similarly, if y = 1 the second inequality is violated, as the expression
on the left hand side is strictly negative. Thus there are no boundary solutions, the
solution is interior and satisfies the conditions:
−xf0(x)G0(y) +
∫ y
0
vdG0(v)f0(x) = 0 and∫ 1
x
vdF0(v)g0(y)− yg0(y)RF0(x) = 0
which can be written as
EG0 [v|v ≤ y] = x and
EF0 [v|v ≥ x] = y
This concludes the proof of the proposition. 
Lemma 4 If constraint (6) holds, then the buyer prefers to stop after having discovered
her value in period t < TB−∆ rather than continue and stop after more than one period.
Proof We directly consider the limit when ∆→ 0. The buyer’s payoff from contin-
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uing after having discovered her value at t and stopping in period τ > t is
[
vBt − pB
(
vBτ
)] G0 (vBτ )
G0 (vSt )
,
and we thus need to show that
[
vBt − pB
(
vBt
)]
G0
(
vBt
) ≥ [vBt − pB (vBτ )]G0 (vBτ ) . (28)
By (6), when
dvBt
dt
> 0 we have
vBt g0
(
vBt
) ≤ dpB (vBt )G0 (vBt )
dvBt
.
Integrating both sides gives
∫ vBτ
vBt
vg0 (v) dv ≤ pB
(
vBτ
)
G0
(
vBτ
)− pB (vBt )G0 (vBt ) ,
and integrating by parts the left hand side yields
vBτ G0
(
vBτ
)− vBt G0 (vBt )− ∫ vBτ
vBt
G0 (v) dv ≤ pB
(
vBτ
)
G0
(
vBτ
)− pB (vBt )G0 (vBt ) ,
or, equivalently,
[
vBt − pB
(
vBτ
)]
G0
(
vBτ
)
+
[
vBτ − vBt
]
G0
(
vBτ
)−∫ vBτ
vBt
G0 (v) dv ≤
[
vBt − pB
(
vBt
)]
G0
(
vBt
)
.
The continuity of G0 implies that there exists a v
B
t∗ ∈
(
vBt , v
B
τ
)
such that the inequality
above can be written as
[
vBt − pB
(
vBτ
)]
G0
(
vBτ
)
+
[
vBτ − vBt
]
G0
(
vBτ
)−∫ vBτ
vBt
G0
(
vBt∗
)
dv ≤ [vBt − pB (vBt )]G0 (vBt ) ,
or
[
vBt − pB
(
vBτ
)]
G0
(
vBτ
)
+
[
vBτ − vBt
] [
G0
(
vBτ
)−G0 (vBt∗)] ≤ [vBt − pB (vBt )]G0 (vBt ) .
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Hence, (28) must hold. This proves that constraint (6) is necessary and sufficient for
the buyer to prefer stopping when she has discovered her value rather than continuing
and stopping after one or more periods. 
Derivation of the seller’s incentive constraint (8) Assume that the buyer
adopts a stopping-at-value strategy and suppose that the seller has just discovered
that her value is vSt . This implies that the buyer has discovered that her value is above
αBt−∆; thus, if the seller stops the shuttle stage, her expected payoff is:
[
pS
(
vSt
)− vSt ] 1− F0 (vSt )1− F0 (αSt−∆) .
Since the buyer accepts to trade at price pB
(
vSt
)
when her value is above vSt by (4),
1−F0(vSt )
1−F0(αSt−∆)
is the seller’s conditional probability of trading and pS
(
vSt
)− vSt is the gain
from trade.
If the seller continues, by (4) and (5), she only obtains a positive payoff if she is the
one stopping at a later date of the shuttle diplomacy stage. The sellers’s payoff from
stopping next period, when the disclosed value is vSt+∆, is
[
pS
(
vSt+∆
)− vSt ] 1− F0 (vSt+∆)1− F0 (αBt−∆) .
Thus, the following constraint must hold for all t:
[
pS
(
vSt
)− vSt ] [1− F0 (vSt )]− [pS (vSt+∆)− vSt ] [1− F0 (vSt+∆)] ≥ 0.
Adding and subtracting pS
(
vSt+∆
) [
1− F0
(
vSt
)]
, the constraint can be written as:
[
pS
(
vSt
)− pS (vSt+∆)] [1− F0 (vSt )]− (pS (vSt+∆)− vSt ) (F0 (vSt )− F0 (vSt+∆)) ≥ 0.
Multiplying by
vSt −vSt+∆
∆
1
vSt −vSt+∆
and taking limits as ∆ → 0, we obtain the following
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constraint for all vSt ∈ [v∗, 1]:[
dpS
(
vSt
)
dvSt
[
1− F0
(
vSt
)]− (pS (vSt )− vSt ) f0 (vSt )
](
−dv
S
t
dt
)
≥ 0.
This is constraint (8) in the main body of the paper.
We have shown that constraint (8) is necessary and sufficient for the seller to prefer
stopping when she has discovered her value to continuing and stopping next period; it
remains to show to (8) is also sufficient for the seller to prefer stopping when she has
discovered her value rather than continuing and stopping after more than one period.
Consider the limit mechanism when ∆ → 0, the seller’s payoff from continuing after
having discovered her value at t and stopping in some future period τ > t is
(
pS
(
vSτ
)− vSt ) 1− F0 (vSτ )1− F0 (vBt ) ,
and we thus need to show that
(
pS
(
vSt
)− vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt )) ≥ (pS (vSτ )− vSt ) (1− F0 (vSτ )) . (29)
By (8), when
dvSt
dt
< 0 we have
vSt f0
(
vSt
) ≥ −dpS (vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt ))
dvSt
.
Integrating both sides gives
∫ vSt
vSτ
vf0 (v) dv ≥ pS
(
vSτ
) (
1− F0
(
vSτ
))− pS (vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt )) ,
and integrating by parts the left hand side yields
−vSτ F0
(
vSτ
)
+vSt F0
(
vSt
)−∫ vSt
vSτ
F0 (v) dv+p
S
(
vSt
) (
1− F0
(
vSt
)) ≥ pS (vSτ ) (1− F0 (vSτ )) ,
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or, equivalently,
(
pS
(
vSt
)− vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt ))+ ∫ vSt
vSτ
(1− F0 (v)) dv ≥
(
pS
(
vSτ
)− vSτ ) (1− F0 (vSτ )) .
The continuity of F0 implies that there exists a v
S
∗ ∈
(
vSτ , v
S
t
)
such that the inequality
above can be written as
(
pS
(
vSt
)− vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt ))+ ∫ vSt
vSτ
(
1− F0
(
vS∗
))
dv ≥ (pS (vSτ )− vSτ ) (1− F0 (vSτ )) ,
or
(
pS
(
vSt
)− vSt ) (1− F0 (vSt ))−(vSt − vSτ ) (F0 (vS∗ )− F0 (vSτ )) ≥ (pS (vSτ )− vSt ) (1− F0 (vSτ )) .
Hence, (29) must hold.

Proof of Lemma 3 First, it is immediate to see that ΦBH
(
1
2
)
= 0. In addition,
using the symmetry properties G0(v) = F0(v), g0(v) = f0(v) = g0(1 − v) = f0(1 − v)
and 1− F0(1− v) = F0(v), we have:
dΦBH(v)
dv
= − [1− F0(v)]F0 (v) +
∫ 1
v
[1− F0 (x)] dxf0 (v) +
∫ 1
1−v
[1− F0 (x)] dxf0(v)
= − [1− F0(v)]F0 (v) +
∫ 1−v
0
F0 (x) dxf0 (v) +
∫ v
0
F0 (x) dxf0(v)
Recalling that for the piecewise linear density function specified in (17) it is F0(v) =(
1− β
4
)
v + β
2
v2 for v ≤ 1
2
, we may evaluate the derivative
dΦBH(v)
dv
at v = 1
2
:
dΦBH(v)
dv
∣∣∣∣
v=1/2
= −1
4
+ 2
((
1− β
4
)
1
8
+
β
6
1
8
)(
1 +
β
4
)
= −1
4
+
1
4
(
1− β
12
)(
1 +
β
4
)
=
β
24
(
1− β
8
)
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It follows that if β < 0, that is if the density function has a trough at v = 1
2
, then the
slope of ΦBH is negative at v =
1
2
. Since ΦBH
(
1
2
)
= 0, this implies that ΦBH (v) > 0 for
values of v smaller but sufficiently close to 1
2
and hence for those values the incentive
constraint (7) is violated. On the contrary, if β > 0, that is, if the density function
has a peak at v = 1
2
, then ΦBH (v) < 0 and so the incentive constraint holds for values
of v in a left neighborhood of v = 1
2
. To show that it holds for all v ∈ [0, 1
2
)
we now
demonstrate that ΦBH is a concave function of v ∈
[
0, 1
2
)
for a sufficiently small β > 0.
Differentiating again ΦBH yields,
d2ΦBH(v)
dv2
= −2 [1− 2F0(v)] f0 (v) +
(∫ 1−v
0
F0 (x) dx+
∫ v
0
F0 (x) dx
)
df0(v)
dv
= −2 [1− (2− β
2
)
v − 2βv2] [1− β
4
+ βv
]
+ β
(∫ 1−v
0
F0 (x) dx+
∫ v
0
F0 (x) dx
)
It is then immediate to see that as β → 0, d2ΦBH(v)
dv2
→ −2(1− 2v), which is negative for
all v < 1
2
. Since
d2ΦBH(v)
dv2
is continuous in β, it follows that for sufficiently small β > 0
the function ΦBH(v) is concave for v ∈
[
0, 1
2
)
. 
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